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Able: Is a Word Just a Word?

IS A WORD JUST A WORD? WHETHER “SADISM” SHOULD BE
A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM
James Riley Able

I. INTRODUCTION
Any given day, nearly 2.3 million people in the United States are held
by the American criminal justice system, with nearly 1.5 million locked
up as convicted inmates in state prisons, federal prisons, or local jails.1
Mass incarceration in the United States has created a carceral state where
correctional facilities are “chronically overcrowded and short-staffed”
and inmates are held “under conditions that increase volatility and the risk
of violence while decreasing the amount of control prison officials have
over the institution.”2 In April 2019, the Department of Justice issued a
gruesome 56-page report on violence in Alabama prisons and gave the
State forty-nine days to respond with a remedial plan, else face a federal
lawsuit for violations of the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments.3 Now, more than ever, it is important to look at prisons
across the country and ensure the inmates are being held in humane and
constitutional settings.
Inmates lose certain rights upon entering prison.4 Namely, the Supreme
Court has held that inmates do not have Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, as the right to privacy is
“fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of
inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and
internal order.”5 Yet, the Court has also stated that no “iron curtain” exists
between prisons and the Constitution;6 an inmate retains constitutional
rights which are not incompatible with the inner workings of the prison.7
1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.
2. Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
881, 887 (2009).
3. Katie Benner & Shaila Dewan, Alabama’s Gruesome Prisons: Report Finds Rape and Murder
at All Hours, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/us/alabamaprisons-doj-investigation.html?module=inline; Kim Chandler, Fed’s Report Condemning Alabama
Prisons: State Vows Action, WBMH.ORG (Apr. 8, 2019), https://wbhm.org/2019/feds-reportcondemning-alabama-prisons-state-vows-action/.
4. See e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 523.
7. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (States must ensure that all inmates have
meaningful access to the courts); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (Regulations
restricting an inmate’s free exercise of religion are constitutional only if reasonably related to legitimate
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If an inmate feels that those rights have been deprived, the resort is a
federal lawsuit through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the workhorse of modern civil
rights litigation.”8
One of the rights that an inmate retains in prison is the right to be free
from excessive force. For citizens outside of prison, this protection stems
from the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures.9 For pre-trial detainees, this protection comes from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 Convicted inmates,
however, find their protection from excessive force in the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.11 The Court
has been clear that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee an inmate
freedom from pain in prison, rather the Eighth Amendment protects
against the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”12
The Court has consistently stated that prison officials should be given
great deference in how their institutions are managed.13 In the context of
excessive force claims, the Supreme Court held in Whitley v. Albers that
“the question [of] whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and
wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on ‘whether force was applied
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’”14 A circuit split has
developed over the role of the word “sadistically” in the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.15
The Eighth Circuit has held repeatedly that the words “maliciously”
and “sadistically” have different meanings, and the two together establish
a higher level of intent than either would alone.16 In 2018, the Ninth
penological objectives).
8. Alan W. Clarke, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the Civil Rights Revolution: How Civil Rights
Litigation Came to Regulate Police and Correctional Officer Misconduct,7 SCHOLAR 151, 152 (2005).
9. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have
used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free
citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard . . . .”).
10. Id. at 395, n.10 (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of
excessive force that amounts to punishment.”).
11. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (“We think the Eighth Amendment, which is
specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as
the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this one, where the
deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.”).
12. Id. at 319 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
13. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (“Because the
realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging
deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators.”).
14. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973)
(Friendly, J.)) (emphasis added).
15. See Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994); Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780 (9th Cir.
2018).
16. See Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994); Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1233-34
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Circuit chose not to follow the Eighth Circuit, instead holding that
excessive force does not require that a prison official acted “sadistically,”
or for his own pleasure, in any way.17 In the Ninth Circuit’s view,
“[s]ometimes a word is just a word.”18
This Note analyzes whether it was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to
disregard a word that the Supreme Court has used repeatedly —
“sadistically” — and whether “sadism” should be a required element of
an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. This Note concludes that it
was proper for the Ninth Circuit to hold that “sadism” is not a required
element of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. This Note also
concludes that requiring an inmate prove the prison official had the
subjective intent to harm gives the official enough protection, while also
ensuring that an inmate is afforded the opportunity to seek legal redress
in a fair and just manner.
The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides
background on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the circuit split
between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits over whether “sadism” is a
required element of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Part III
analyzes whether the word “sadistically” is properly viewed as part of the
Court’s Whitley holding, dicta, or something else altogether. Part III then
discusses whether an inmate should have to prove “sadism” on the part of
a prison official. Finally, Part IV provides a brief conclusion and a look
toward the future in this area of law.
II. BACKGROUND
Part A of this section begins with an overview of the history of the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, its meaning to the Framers,
and the current standards by which a violation of the Eighth Amendment
is found. Part B then describes the development of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence with respect to excessive force and deliberate indifference
claims against prison officials. Finally, Part C details the current circuit
split on whether an inmate must prove that a prison official acted
“sadistically” when using force to succeed on an excessive force claim.
A. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution reads: “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

(8th Cir. 1998); Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2017).
17. Hoard, 904 F.3d at 782.
18. Id. at 789.
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punishments inflicted.”19 Almost identical language appeared in the
English Bill of Rights of 1689.20 It is generally believed that the primary
concern of the Framers in drafting the Eighth Amendment was to prohibit
torture and other barbaric methods of punishment, but legal scholars have
debated whether this interpretation is correct.21 The Supreme Court
refused to deviate from this narrow purpose of the Eighth Amendment
throughout the Nineteenth Century.22 In Wilkerson v. Utah, the Supreme
Court declined to “define with exactness” the protections of the Eighth
Amendment.23 Instead, the Court upheld Utah’s use of execution by being
“shot, hanged, or beheaded,” holding only that punishments of “torture .
. . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by
that amendment.”24
In Weems v. United States, the Court first took the position that the
Eighth Amendment should be broadened in scope to cover any instances
of disproportionate punishment.25 “[I]t is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the
offense.”26 It was not until 1958, in Trop v. Dulles, that the Supreme Court
established the modern standard by which Eighth Amendment claims are
judged.27 The Court cited Weems for the principle that the words of the
Eighth Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static.28 Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, then stated: “The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”29
B. “Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain”
In Gregg v. Georgia, a joint opinion of the Court synthesized prior

19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. English Bill of Rights of 1689 (“That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nore [sic] cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”) (emphasis added),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp.
21. See Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that the conclusions of the American Framers were based
on a misinterpretation of the English Bill of Rights, spawning an American doctrine that the words “cruel
and unusual” proscribed torture, not excessive punishment).
22. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
(“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . .”).
23. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36.
24. Id. (The Court in an earlier portion of the opinion gives a particularly grisly list of what it
considers “torture”, the list of which is unnecessary to repeat here).
25. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
26. Id. at 366-67.
27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
28. Id. at 100-01.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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precedent into a series of workable tests.30 An assessment of
contemporary values to determine whether a challenged sanction offends
“evolving standards of decency” requires looking to objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward that sanction.31 When a form of
punishment is being challenged in the abstract, for example, whether the
death penalty may ever be imposed for murder, two additional inquiries
must be made. First, the punishment must not involve “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,” and second, the punishment must not be
“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”32 Broadly
speaking, the Court held that a sanction imposed “cannot be so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction
of suffering.”33
Four-months after Gregg, the Court issued its opinion in Estelle v.
Gamble and made clear that the Eighth Amendment proscribes the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”34 In Estelle, an inmate
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against prison officials, arguing that his
denial of medical treatment constituted “cruel and unusual punishment”
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.35 Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, found that whether it is a doctor ignoring a prisoner’s need for
treatment, or a prison guard intentionally denying or delaying treatment,
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.”36 Justice Marshall was clear to distinguish medical
accidents or even mere negligence from the type of “deliberate
indifference” that would amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.37 In
his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court was placing improper
significance on the subjective motivations of a prison official.38 In his
opinion, the constitutional standard should turn on the “character of the
punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted
it.”39
C. “Maliciously and Sadistically”
While Estelle established the general requirement that an Eighth
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Id. at 99-101.
Id. at 104 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Amendment violation requires the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,” the Court held ten-years later in Whitley v. Albers that a more
searching inquiry is necessary when looking at claims of excessive force
against prison officials.40 In Whitley, a prison official wounded an inmate
by gunshot during a prison riot.41 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court,
agreed with the reasoning of Estelle that mere negligence on the part of a
prison official does not establish a claim of cruel and unusual punishment,
and phrased the standard as “obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence
or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.”42
While agreeing that “deliberate indifference” was an appropriate
standard for the specific facts of Estelle, the Court found that the standard
did not “adequately capture the importance” of protecting prison staff,
visitors, or other inmates during a security disturbance.43 The Court
reasoned that prison staff must be granted a wide-ranging deference when
it comes to policies and practices related to preserving order and
discipline.44 The Court also explicitly stated that no judge nor jury should
“freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a
considered choice” and that no case should go to a jury if the evidence
does not go beyond a “mere dispute over the reasonableness of a
particular use of force.”45 The Court held that the question of whether
actions of a prison staff member inflicted “unnecessary and wanton pain
and suffering ultimately turns on ‘whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.’”46
The Court lifted the language of this new standard directly from the
Second Circuit case of Johnson v. Glick.47 In Johnson, a prison guard
allegedly attacked an inmate unprovoked and then withheld medical
attention for over two hours.48 In this pre-Gregg and pre-Estelle case, the
Second Circuit found that constitutional protection against excessive
force by state officials is not limited to the specific commands of the
Eighth Amendment.49 Instead, acts of brutality by correctional officers
can amount to “conduct that shocks the conscience” of a court, therefore
depriving an inmate of liberty without due process of law in violation of
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
Id. at 314-17.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321-22 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.)).
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
Id. at 1029-30.
Id. at 1032.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.50 The Second Circuit reasoned that while not
every push or shove to an inmate amounted to a constitutional violation,
several factors could be used to determine if a due process violation
occurred.51 The factors included the need for force, the fit between the
need for force and the force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and
“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.”52
The Second Circuit listed the subjective intent of the prison staff
member as only one factor in determining if a due process violation
occurred.53 In Whitley, Justice O’Connor found the last factor to be the
ultimate question and quoted the others as only relevant to the ultimate
determination of subjective intent.54 Justice O’Connor then stated that it
is the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, that serves as
the “primary source of protection” to prison inmates.55 Justice O’Connor
stated it would be surprising if “conduct that shocks the conscience of the
court” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment were not also
inconsistent with the “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.56 The Court made clear, however, that the Due
Process Clause offers no further protection for prison inmates than the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and that excessive force claims
against prison officials should be brought under the Eighth Amendment.57
The Court clearly stated that all Eighth Amendment cases “mandate
inquiry into a prison official’s state of mind” and “some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting officer” before an act may be deemed
cruel and unusual punishment.58 In the years since Whitley, the Court has
consistently emphasized that the ultimate question for the factfinder to
determine in Eighth Amendment excessive force claims brought by
inmates is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”59 In
reaffirming the subjective standard of Whitley in the years since, the Court
50. Id. at 1032-33 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
51. Id. at 1033.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (“As the District Judge [sic] correctly perceived,
‘such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted,’ 481 F.2d, at 1033, are relevant to that ultimate
determination.”).
55. Id. at 327.
56. Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976)).
57. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327.
58. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1991).
59. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010).
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also made clear that it is not the extent of an inmate’s injuries that forms
the basis of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.60 In Hudson v.
McMillian, the Court found that when prison officials “maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency
always are violated,” thus establishing an Eighth Amendment claim even
without serious injury.61
D. The Circuit Split
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson in 2015, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a subjective intent standard or an objective
unreasonableness standard applies to an excessive force claim by a pretrial detainee, as opposed to a convicted inmate.62 In Kingsley, an
individual who had been held in a Wisconsin county jail awaiting trial on
a drug charge alleged that jail officials slammed his head into a concrete
bunk, applied a Taser to him for five seconds, and left him alone and
handcuffed for fifteen minutes.63 First, the Court found that, because a
pre-trial detainee cannot be punished, his protections flow from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth
Amendment.64 Then, the Court held that a court must use an objective
standard of reasonableness when judging whether the force used against
a pre-trial detainee is excessive.65 Toward the end of his majority opinion,
Justice Breyer acknowledged that ruling in favor of an objective standard
when judging Fourteenth Amendment claims of pre-trial detainees “may
raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in the context of
excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners.”66 The Court,
however, did no more than address this possibility.67
In Kingsley, the Supreme Court clearly left the door open for plaintiffs
and courts to question whether a subjective standard is the proper way to
judge Eighth Amendment violations.68 What has developed instead is a
narrower circuit split over whether the subjective mental state of “sadism”

60. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
61. Id. (drawing a distinction between excessive force claims and deliberate indifference to
medical needs claims, where an Eighth Amendment claim arises only if medical needs are “serious”).
62. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2475.
65. Id. at 2472-73.
66. Id. at 2476.
67. Id.
68. See Michael S. DiBattista, Note, A Force to Be Reckoned with: Confronting the (Still)
Unresolved Questions of Excessive Force Jurisprudence After Kingsley, 48 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L.
REV. 203 (2017).
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is a required element of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.69
This circuit split has specifically developed around controversies related
to jury instructions and how the standard of liability defined.
1. Eighth Circuit Precedent
One year after the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Whitley “good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm” standard for excessive force claims brought by convicted
inmates, the Eight Circuit heard Cummings v. Malone.70 At trial in that
case, a jury found two prison officials liable for violating an inmate’s
Eighth Amendment rights when they beat him on multiple occasions.71
The jury was instructed, in part, as follows:
In determining whether the force, if any, as used in these instructions, was
excessive, you must consider such factors as the need for the application
of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted and whether the
force was applied in [sic] good faith effort to achieve a legitimate purpose
or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.72

On appeal, the Eight Circuit found that these instructions did not
adequately state the law of Eighth Amendment liability and therefore
constituted reversible error.73 The court held that it was error for the
district court not to clearly state which “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain” standard was applicable (i.e. “deliberate indifference” or
“maliciously and sadistically”).74 The Eighth Circuit also held that,
because the “Supreme Court has held that the malicious and sadistic
standard is the ‘core judicial inquiry’ in excessive force claims,” it was an
error for the district court to merely list the standard as one factor among
many in the jury instructions.75 The Eighth Circuit did not explicitly hold
that failure to mention “sadistically” in the instruction was an error.
While the court in Cummings did not explicitly find the word
“sadistically” to be essential to the jury instructions at issue, it was not
long before the court would revisit the issue. In Howard v. Barnett, not
even one year after Cummings, the Eight Circuit interpreted Cummings as
standing for the proposition that when faced with an excessive force
claim, a jury must find that a prison official acted both “maliciously” and
69. See Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994); Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780 (9th Cir.
2018).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Cummings v. Malone, 995 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 819.
Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
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“sadistically.”76 The court found that the use of the word “sadistically” by
the Supreme Court carried a certain significance, because “maliciously”
and “sadistically” have two different meanings, and “the two together
establish a higher level of intent than would either alone.”77 The court,
using standard dictionary definitions, found that one acts “‘maliciously’
by undertaking, without just cause or reason, a course of action intended
to injure another,” whereas one acts “‘sadistically’ by engaging in
extreme or excessive cruelty or by delighting in cruelty.”78 The Eighth
Circuit rejected the argument that the term “sadistically” was “surplusage
and not a required element” and also rejected the argument that its
inclusion could confuse the jury into believing that a prison official could
not violate the Eighth Amendment without deriving “sexual satisfaction”
from the use of excessive force.79
The Eighth Circuit has since been consistent in holding that the term
“sadistically” is not surplusage.80 In Parkus v. Delo, the court rejected an
inmate’s argument that the district court overstated the state of mind a
prison official must have by defining “sadistic behavior in terms of
‘extreme or excessive cruelty or delighting in cruelty’ as opposed to
‘regular cruelty.’”81 The Eighth Circuit found that the definition from
Howard properly focused the jury on the subjective motivations of the
prison official.82 The Eighth Circuit also found that its “delighting in
cruelty” definition of “sadistically” was essentially the same as the
definition approved by the Third Circuit, “to inflict pain on the person for
one's own pleasure.”83
As recently as 2017, the Eighth Circuit again stated “[t]he word
‘sadistically’ is not surplusage.”84 In Jackson v. Gutzmer, the Eighth
Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity for a prison official who
authorized the use of a restraint board in response to an inmate he
perceived to be self-injurious.85 Qualified immunity “shields a
government official from liability unless his conduct violates ‘clearly
76. Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1994).
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1367, 1997–98 (unabridged
1981); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956, 958, 1336 (6th ed. 1990); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 759, 1084 (2d ed. 1982)).
79. Id. at 871.
80. See Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1998); Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d
969, 974 (8th Cir. 2017).
81. Parkus, 135 F.3d at 1234.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 n.13 (3rd Cir. 1995)).
84. Jackson, 866 F.3d at 974.
85. Id. at 978 (It is worth noting that the prison official fully complied with Department of
Corrections procedures by videotaping the restraint, obtaining prior medical clearance, and consulting
with a nurse to ensure the restraints were not injurious or painful to the inmate. Id. at 977).
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’”86 The inmate had argued at the district court level
and the appellate level that the restraint board was used, not because he
was self-injurious, but instead as punishment and retaliation for seeking
medical attention.87 Because the totality of the circumstances justified the
use of the restraint board and the inmate did not present any evidence that
the prison official acted maliciously or sadistically, qualified immunity
was appropriate.88
2. Hoard v. Hartman89
On December 21, 2012, Sean Hoard, an inmate in the Intensive
Management Unit at Snake River Correctional Institution in eastern
Oregon, requested a razor for personal use.90 When it did not work, Hoard
broke the razor and flushed it down the toilet in his cell out of
frustration.91 When a prison official was unable to retrieve the razor, the
official ordered a full search of Hoard’s cell.92 It was shortly after this that
Hoard alleged that one Officer Hartman slammed Hoard’s head against a
steel door.93 Hoard alleged that when he came to his senses, his pants and
underwear were down to his ankles, leaving him exposed to other
inmates.94 Hoard alleged that after this, Officer Hartman proceeded to
slam Hoard’s head against the floor, causing his cut forehead to scrape
across a steel drain.95 A few days after this, Hoard attempted suicide,
fueled in part by his embarrassment at being exposed to fellow inmates,
inmates he considered to be predators.96 Hoard was placed on a liquid diet
for a time, prescribed painkillers and a mouthguard, but still suffered
continuous pain for years after the incident.97
Prison officials testified at trial that Hoard began thrashing during the
search of his cell and the force they used was “minimal.”98 The altercation
was not videotaped and the internal memos from Officer Hartman and

86. Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
87. Jackson, 866 F.3d at 978.
88. Id. at 976-78.
89. Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2018).
90. Id. at 782-83.
91. Id. at 783.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 783-84.
96. Id. at 784.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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others did not mention Hoard’s injuries, but a prison report prepared
afterwards described blood on the floor.99
Hoard filed a pro se complaint alleging constitutional and state law
violations against several prison officials, and after a two-day trial his
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Officer Hartman
reached the jury.100 The jury was instructed that Hoard had to prove that
Officer Hartman “‘used excessive and unnecessary force against the
plaintiff under all the circumstances’ . . . ‘acted maliciously and
sadistically for the purpose of causing harm,’ and that Officer Hartman’s
acts harmed Hoard.”101 Midway through deliberations, the jury asked for
definitions of the terms “maliciously” and “sadistically”, and the judge
responded with a supplemental instruction stating:
The term “maliciously” in the instructions has its ordinary meaning,
which is “having or showing a desire to cause harm to another.” Likewise,
the term “sadistically” has its ordinary meaning, which in this context
means “having or deriving pleasure from extreme cruelty.”102
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Officer Hartman. Several jurors,
however, commented after that they had reservations about the lack of a
video recording of the incident and the incomplete nature of the officer’s
reports from the incident.103
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Constitution does not require
proof of sadism, and therefore the supplemental jury instructions were
plainly erroneous and likely prejudiced the outcome of the case.104 Rather
than zero in on the terms “maliciously and sadistically” in Supreme Court
precedent, the Ninth Circuit focused on the phrase “for the very purpose
of causing harm,” finding that “officer intent—not officer enjoyment—
serves as the dividing factor between constitutional and unconstitutional
applications of force.”105
The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation of Whitley.106 In the court’s view, court opinions are
different than statutes, where each word chosen is worthy of “searching

99. Id.
100. Id. at 785 (The district court liberally construed Hoard’s complaint as raising four claims: a §
1983 claim for violating Hoard’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; a § 1983 excessive force
and deliberate indifference claim against each of the officers involved; supplemental state common law
claims against all Defendants; and state constitutional claims against Officer Hartman and another
officer).
101. Id. at 786.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 787.
105. Id. at 788.
106. Id.
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analysis.”107 The Ninth Circuit then noted: “Sometimes, a word is just
word.”108 The court pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court has never
addressed the phrase “maliciously and sadistically” separately from the
specific intent to cause harm as evidence that intent to cause harm is all
that is needed for Eighth Amendment liability.109 Thus, under the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning, “maliciously and sadistically” serve a purely
rhetorical function, present in Court precedent only to emphasize “the
cruelty inherent in harming an inmate for no other reason than to cause
harm.”110 The question before the Ninth Circuit was not whether an
officer who harms an inmate for personal enjoyment has violated the
Eighth Amendment, but rather “whether proof of sadism is required for
excessive force claims.”111 The Ninth Circuit held it is not.112
The Ninth Circuit went on to state that requiring Hoard to prove
sadism, or personal enjoyment on the part of Officer Hartman, “placed a
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the Defendants.”113 The Ninth
Circuit concluded by stating that the Eighth Amendment “reflects this
country’s fundamental respect for humanity. . . . That respect is lost when
courts close the doors to relief by asking plaintiffs to prove that they were
the victims of not just cruelty, but sadism as well.”114
III. DISCUSSION
Part A of this section begins with an analysis of whether the Ninth
Circuit was correct to disregard “sadistic” as “just a word” or whether its
inclusion in Supreme Court holdings necessarily elevates it to an element
of an excessive force claim brought by a convicted inmate. Part B then
addresses whether “sadistic intent” should be a required element of an
excessive force claim brought by an inmate and concludes that proof of
sadism should not be required. The requirement that an inmate prove a
subjective intent to harm gives prison officials room to protect themselves
and other inmates, while also ensuring that an inmate is afforded the
opportunity to seek legal redress in a fair and just manner.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. (quoting United States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Hoard, 904 F.3d at 789.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 792.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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A. Is a Word “Just a Word?”
Before analyzing whether “sadism” should be a required element of an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim brought by an inmate, it is first
necessary to discuss whether it was proper for the Ninth Circuit to rule
that it is not. The Ninth Circuit stated with a certain brazenness, that
“[s]ometimes, a word is just a word.”115 And yet, the Supreme Court has
made clear that it has the ultimate say in interpreting the Constitution.116
Can a word chosen by the Supreme Court really be “just a word”?
The Ninth Circuit cited its own case of United States v. Muckleshoot
Indian Tribe for the principle that “[o]pinions, unlike statutes, are not
usually written with the knowledge or expectation that each and every
word may be the subject of searching analysis.”117 In Muckleshoot, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted a district court opinion regarding fishing rights
and was tasked with deciding whether the district court meant to include
a right to shellfish in the area along with fin fish.118 In such a case, a
district court judge could not have foreseen every possible controversy
that would arise from his word choice.119 It is not controversial to say an
appellate court has great leeway in interpreting what a lower court meant.
Here, however, the Ninth Circuit is dealing with the words of the
Supreme Court, which has the power to create binding law on each of the
courts of appeals, a concept known as “vertical stare decisis.”120 The
Supreme Court has stated that stare decisis preserves “a jurisprudential
system that is not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion’”121 and also
“permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the
law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.”122 But not every word
of a Supreme Court opinion is binding on a lower court.
Naturally, a lower court is bound only by the higher court’s holding.123
115. Id. at 789.
116. See generally Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421
(1819) (“[A]ll means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that, in the end, our own judgment will be
brought to bear . . . .”).
117. United States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 2000).
118. Id. at 431.
119. See also Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (“To keep opinions within
reasonable bounds precludes writing into them every limitation or variation which might be suggested by
the circumstances of cases not before the Court.”).
120. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 956-57
(2005) (“Vertical stare decisis is generally considered absolute.”).
121. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
78, 490 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
122. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
123. See Abramowicz, supra note 120 at 957.
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The holding of a case is the court’s “determination of a matter of law
pivotal to its decision; a principle drawn from such a decision.”124
Everything else in an opinion is dicta, which carries no precedential value
and is not binding on lower courts.125 The distinction between holding and
dicta can be difficult and is fodder for lawyers.126 If the use of the word
“sadistically” in Supreme Court jurisprudence is mere dicta, then the
Ninth Circuit was free to disregard it.
When looking at the decisions in Whitley and Hudson, the word
sadistically is not dicta. In Whitley, the Court stated that the “question of
whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and
suffering ultimately turns on ‘whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.’”127 In Hudson, the Court stated: “[W]e
hold that whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive
physical force . . . the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley:
whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”128 In light of
this language from the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the word
“sadistically” is dicta, and for that reason the Ninth Circuit correctly
found that it needed another route to its holding that “sadism” is not
required in an excessive force claim.
Having established that the word “sadistically” is used in the explicit
holdings of Whitley and Hudson, it follows that the Eighth Circuit is
correct in finding the word is not “surplusage.”129 The Supreme Court has
also stated, however, that “the language of an opinion is not always to be
parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.”130 Perhaps
the most helpful tool for solving this impasse is in how Judge Aldisert
dissected stare decisis, an abbreviation of “stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to stand by or adhere to decisions and not disturb that which is
settled).”131 In Judge Aldisert’s opinion, subsequent courts are bound in
stare decisis to what the court did, not what the court said.132
124. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
125. See Ruggero J. Aldisert Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It and When
Do
We
Kill
It?,
17
PEPP.
L.
REV.
605,
631-32
(1990),
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/2.
126. See Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
219 (2010).
127. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.)) (emphasis added).
128. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (emphasis added).
129. Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d
868, 872 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1998).
130. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979).
131. Aldisert, supra note 125 at 607.
132. Aldisert, supra note 125 at 607.
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The Ninth Circuit in Hoard applied somewhat of a variation of Judge
Aldisert’s analysis by stating that the strongest evidence against sadism
being a required element of an excessive force claim is that the Supreme
Court has never addressed “maliciously and sadistically” separately from
the specific intent to cause harm.133 The Ninth Circuit highlights that on
one occasion, the Court omitted any mention of “maliciously and
sadistically” altogether and simply explained that “a purpose to cause
harm is needed for Eighth Amendment liability . . . .”134 But the case in
which that phrasing appears is one dealing with the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, not the Eighth Amendment, and to prop it up as evidence
of the proper excessive force standard is to parse the language of an
opinion and elevate dicta to the status of holding.135 It would have been
stronger for the Ninth Circuit to point to the fact that the Court has never
held that a correctional officer possessed a sadistic intent, meaning
deriving pleasure from causing pain.
The cause of this confusion can be traced back to Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in Whitley. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, Whitley was not intended
to substantively change the law on excessive force beyond requiring an
intent to cause harm.136 But requiring an intent to cause harm, and
therefore an inquiry into a correctional officer’s subjective state of mind,
was a major shift in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In
shifting the focus from the objective acts to the subjective state of mind,
Justice O’Connor lifted her key “question” directly from Johnson v.
Glick. As stated previously, the list of factors Judge Friendly enumerated
in Johnson v. Glick were under a “shocks the conscience” due process
analysis.137 Judge Friendly would have been hard pressed to find a judge
whose conscience would not have been shocked by a sadistic prison guard
inflicting pain on inmates for his own pleasure. The phrase “maliciously
and sadistically” fit neatly into a long list of factors that could shock the
conscience of a court, but none of Judge Friendly’s factors were sufficient
and none were dispositive.138 Instead, a “malicious and sadistic” intent
was one factor that “if present, could enable a [pretrial detainee] plaintiff
to survive a motion to dismiss when otherwise the facts might be
insufficient to make out a [substantive due process] claim.”139
Justice O’Connor latched onto the last factor of Johnson v. Glick as the
133. Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 789 (9th Cir. 2018).
134. Id. (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1998)).
135. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1998).
136. Hoard, 904 F.3d at 789.
137. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
138. Id. (“In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such
factors as . . .” (emphasis added)).
139. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 329 n.1 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson,
481 F.2d at 1033).
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new subjective test for an Eighth Amendment excessive force violation.
This shift away from the objective “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” standard to a purely subjective analysis was major. Perhaps Justice
O’Connor wanted to quote Judge Friendly’s Second Circuit opinion to
give the change in law some legitimacy, or perhaps she liked the turn of
phrase. Either way, adopting a single factor from a due process analysis
to fit a new subjective test under the Eighth Amendment is the true source
of this confusion.
B. Should “Sadism” Be an Element of Excessive Force?
In Howard, the Eighth Circuit stated that “‘maliciously’ and
‘sadistically’ have different meanings, and the two together establish a
higher level of intent than would either alone.”140 Having established that
it was not improper for the Ninth Circuit to rule that “sadism” is not a
required element of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, the
question remains as to whether it should be. Should a plaintiff inmate be
required to prove that a prison guard acted “sadistically” when using force
in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim? When considering
Supreme Court precedent combined with the practical implications of
such a rule, an inmate should not be required to prove that a prison guard
acted “sadistically.”
First, whether a corrections officer derives pleasure from his acts has
no bearing on the harm done to the inmate. Take, for example, the case of
Sean Hoard. If Hoard began thrashing during the search of his cell to the
point that the prison officials were at risk, then the use of force would
have been necessary to ensure the safety of the officials.141 Protecting
prison officials or other inmates through the use of force falls squarely
within the State’s police power.142 It was in this type of scenario that the
Court in Whitley was most concerned with protecting officers from
liability.143 And the Court has indicated it is comfortable with reality that
a certain level of physical force, including force that causes pain, is a part
of prison life.144 Requiring a subjective inquiry into the prison official’s
intent is designed to insulate guards from liability whose actions are taken
140. Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1994).
141. Hoard, 904 F.3d at 784.
142. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“[T]he police power of a state must
be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will protect the public health and the public
safety.”).
143. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1986)) (“Prison
administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies
and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”).
144. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).
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“in response to riotous inmates” or “breaches of prison discipline” by
preventing a judge or jury from substituting their judgment.145
The Whitley standard, however, is not designed to “insulate from
review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate penological
purpose.”146 If the prison official slammed Hoard’s head into his cell door
unprovoked, then this would be an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.”147 Whether the prison official derived pleasure from the harm he
caused does not change the nature of the harm that was done to Hoard. A
prison official sadistically causing harm for his own enjoyment may
offend society’s standards of decency more than prison official who acts
cold and emotionlessly. But either way, the pain caused to Hoard, and
inmates like him, is still unnecessary and wanton. Holding the official
liable for acting with no other intent than to cause harm would protect
Hoard’s Eighth Amendment rights, while insulating prison officials who
act in good faith and through reasoned choices.
Second, requiring proof of a sadistic intent would be a near impossible
hurdle for plaintiff inmates to overcome. In tort law, an actor is liable for
battery if “(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact
with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person
of the other directly or indirectly results.”148 In criminal law, the State
may be required to prove that a crime was “premeditated,” meaning it was
“done with willful deliberation and planning; consciously considered
beforehand; plotted in advance.”149 Each of these comes with its own
challenges for a claimant But nowhere else in the law is it required to
prove that an actor enjoyed what he did. Subjective enjoyment may be
offered by an attorney as circumstantial proof of intent, but it is never a
requisite element.
Without a smoking gun statement from a prison official, there is simply
no way that a plaintiff inmate could prove a prison official’s subjective
enjoyment. A prison official enjoys the protection of “qualified
immunity” and cannot be held liable for excessive force “unless he has
violated a 'clearly established' right, such that 'it would [have been] clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.’”150 Qualified immunity is said to protect all but “the plainly

145. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 320.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
149. Premeditated, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
150. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 202 (2001)).
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incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”151 For that reason,
prison officials do not need the shield of an impossibly high level of
intent.
Third, if inmates do not have a path to the courts through 42 U.S.C. §
1983, prisons have no incentive to properly train their officials or protect
inmates from excessive force violations. After the jury’s verdict in Hoard,
the jurors expressed discomfort at the “incomplete” nature of the prison
reports.152 One juror went as far as to state that things needed to be
addressed in this kind of situation.153 Hoard’s encounter with prison
officials was not video recorded.154 Without the threat of litigation, and
without the threat of monetary settlements and/or injunctions, prisons
have no incentive to avoid encounters like the one between Officer
Hartman and Sean Hoard. This is contrary to public policy. In fact, prisons
should see to it that every interaction between a guard and an inmate is
video recorded. Doing so will not only protect the inmate, but it will also
protect guards who act professionally from frivolous lawsuits. More
cameras combined with better training could protect inmates like Sean
Hoard. However, if Hoard’s claim were to be decided at the summary
judgment stage because he has no proof of Officer Hartman’s sadism,
then the status quo will continue without end.
Lastly, the inherent dignity of the person, no matter their crime,
requires fairness in the law. The Eighth Amendment stands as a testament
to this country’s “fundamental respect for humanity” by protecting every
citizen from cruel and unusual punishment.155 The Ninth Circuit stated,
“[t]hat respect is lost when courts close the doors to relief by asking
plaintiffs to prove that they were the victims of not just cruelty, but sadism
as well.”156 For this reason, the question in an Eighth Amendment
excessive force case should be whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or only with the intent to cause
harm.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress and the Supreme Court have always been hesitant to expand
the path of an inmate to the courts. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 made it so inmates must exhaust all of their administrative remedies

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 784.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
Hoard, 904 F.3d at 786.
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before filing a Section 1983 action related to prison conditions.157 The
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 placed strict
procedural limits on an inmate’s ability to file for federal habeas relief,
while narrowing the substantive grounds by which a federal judge could
grant habeas relief.158 In Lewis v. Casey, the Supreme Court held that in
order to show that a prison has restricted an inmate’s right to access a
court, the inmate must show that he has suffered actual harm.159 Further,
the Court held that inmates do not have a constitutional right to law
libraries or legal resources, only a constitutional right to access the
courts.160 Congress and the Supreme Court are continually worried about
a flood of frivolous lawsuits overrunning the court systems.
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
however, stands for the proposition that in the United States there are
certain things that we, as a country, will not allow. A prison official’s use
of excessive force without penological justification must be included in
the list of what the Eighth Amendment prohibits. As it stands now, the
Eighth Circuit’s requirement that an inmate prove “sadism” on the part of
a prison official has made it such that cruel and unusual punishment can
occur without the prison or the officer facing real consequences. The
Ninth Circuit was correct to find that “sadism” should not be a required
element of an excessive force claim because reading that high level of
subjective intent into the Eight Amendment analysis simply dilutes the
appropriate standard and removes Eight Amendments protections from
those who really need them—inmates.
The Court in Kingsley indicated a willingness to reconsider the
subjective Whitley standard altogether and instead hold that an objective
standard applies to excessive force claims filed by convicted inmates.
With the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, it is unclear
if a majority exists to support an objective standard. If and when the Court
is next faced with an excessive force claim, at a bare minimum, the Court
should follow the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Hoard and find that “sadism”
is not a required element of an excessive force claim.
Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence in Davis v. Ayala, "Prisoners
are shut away – out of sight, out of mind.”161 But as Justice Brandeis
famously said, “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.”162 Giving an inmate the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
Id. at 350.
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).
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fighting chance of receiving a just outcome against his abuser will help
ensure humane conditions and fair treatment for inmates across the
country.
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